A marketable permits system (MPS) has been deemed effective in laboratory experiments, however, little is known about how the MPS works in the field. We evaluate the MPS efficiency for forest conservation by framed field experiments in Nepal. Forestland demands are elicited from farmers, with which the experiments are carried out. The novelty lies in instituting a uniform price auction (UPA) under trader settings and in identifying the efficiency in the field of developing nations. The results suggest that farmers with limited education understand UPA rules, reveal their forestland valuations and that the MPS is effective with 80% of efficiency.
that the setup of our field experiment is in contrast to the laboratory setting with induced value elementary educations could understand and follow the rules of trading and (ii) they are induced to along with political instability, absence of social reforms and imprudent utilization of resources 126 (Gilmour et al., 1989) .
Community forestry is a voluntary forestry management system in which the CFUG members 128 contribute labor to organizing some collective activities of forest protection and management, such 129 as meeting, harvesting, weeding, thinning, pruning and guarding. In return, they are allowed 130 to harvest non-timber products. Harvesting non-timber products is highly labor-intensive. Poor 131 households do not usually possess land and cattle (Adhikari et al., 2004) . Thus, firewood is the only 132 non-timber product they are motivated to harvest. Unfortunately, however, it is reported that such 133 poor households cannot sufficiently allocate their own labor for harvesting firewood because they 134 are swamped with daily agricultural labor works and do not have enough money to hire additional 135 external labor (Adhikari et al., 2007) .
136
Relatively high-income or middle-income households within the CFUG usually possess land 137 and cattle so that they are motivated to harvest a variety of non-timber products such as leaf litter,
138
fodder and thatching materials (Adhikari et al., 2007) . Since they are not struggling with their 139 daily life compared to poor households, they can allocate their own time to harvest such non-140 timber products or can even hire additional external labor. Therefore, poor households do not 141 utilize the opportunities of CFUG, while middle-income or high-income households utilize them 142 more efficiently (Adhikari et al., 2004 (Adhikari et al., , 2007 .
143
In summary, community forestry management as a participatory system had been considered 144 a viable solution to forestland preservation. However, it have resulted in undesirable outcomes 145 for poor households due to the aforementioned problems. Previous literature has supported this 146 finding, and the community forestry management system is claimed to be inefficient in its process 147 because poor households are deprived of the appropriation of resources and the benefits of sharing 148 (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001 , Adhikari et al., 2004 , 2007 . Consequently, this system has not nec-149 essarily helped poor people in Nepal, but has often worked to their disadvantage (Graner, 1997 , 150 Adhikari et al., 2007 . Gautam (1987) argues that the indigenous forest management is more equi-table and effective in conserving nature's integrity than community forestry because the latter fails 152 to achieve an equitable cost-benefit sharing arrangement for society. The consequences of such a 153 failure have led to inefficiencies and have opened the door to the inceptions of feasible and alter-native institutional setups for new forest management to enhance the access of poorer households 155 to the forest.
156
The MPS could be a solution when applied to forestland management, as it gives a right to the 157 people to utilize forest products without clear-cutting timbers. This approach can provide equal 158 rights to all individuals, and by holding the permits, each individual can commercially utilize 159 forestland under some controlled regulations. To implement the MPS, local farmers are required 160 to enter into a time contract to attain an arranged number of permits for forestland use, in which 161 they can carry out agro-forestry farming. Initial permits can be allocated equally without socio-162 economic discrimination and, thus, the MPS can address inequitable distributions of resources 163 through the allocation of initial rights.
164
The Shaktikhore village development committee is located in Chitwan district of the southern Subsistence farming in that region is based on a triangular relationship among the farms, the 173 cattle and the forests (Adhikari et al., 2004 Nepal. Finally, we explain the procedure and the general sequence of experiments.
187
The field experiment was conducted at the community hall, which was especially constructed design is given in table 1. In the first stage, each subject had to go through a survey interview for 194 the elicitation of EVs for each unit of commercial forestland he (she) demands.
195
[ Given the time & money constraints and geographic settings for our field experiments, this is the maximum number of subjects we could collect. For instance, we randomly picked forest users from different villages to avoid a situation where subjects in a session know each other. It takes more than 5-7 hours to go from one village to another village on foot where roads are not paved. Likewise, one subject needed to come to the city hall for our field experiments by walking of 5 hours on average. the given unit is of commercial forest (See the row "Economic Value (EV)" in (See, e.g., Cummings et al., 1986, Mitchell and Carson, 1988 After the collection of EVs, we derived the aggregate demand of forestland for each session 220 10 Every subject in this framed field experiment possesses hands-on experiences in practicing forest management, because people's life in these areas is highly dependent upon forests. When we elicited the WTP per unit of commercial forest, we asked subjects to answer the WTP focusing only on the net "economic" value (EV) they can gain. This question was easily answered by the subjects in our survey. 11 We acknowledge that monitoring and enforcement for obligations or regulations in managing community forestry are crucial issues for MPS, and there exist several works that focus on this issue (Murphy and Stranlund, 2006 , 2007 , 2008 . However, note that monitoring and enforcement are out of our scope in this paper. This is because our field experiment becomes too complex for subjects if we try to include that aspect in the experimental design.
12 Note that some respondents reported zero WTP for units of forestland less than 10, such as 8 or 5 units. In such cases, the EV cells for the units corresponding to zero WTP are trimmed accordingly. and becomes zero around the 60th unit of forestland.
227
We subsequently determined the capped level of commercial forestland provided by the permits 228 in the MPS. For this calculation, we referred to previous studies suggesting that about 62% of a 229 total forestland of 3.5 million hectares has been handed to the CFUG for preservation where only 230 non-timber products can be harvested mainly for non-commercial purposes, and it is expected to be 231 preserved up to 70% (Regmi, 2000) . In this scenario of gradually transferring accessible forestland 232 to the community for preservation, we assume that 70% of forestland is conserved under current 233 CFUG schemes, while the rest of 30% is managed and utilized by the MPS. To mimic this scenario,
234
30% of the total demand was allocated to subjects as marketable permits in the field experiments.
235
Given the conditions, the initial permit endowments were randomly allocated to all subjects such 236 that the total capped level was allotted to preserve 70% of forestland. Table 2 shows that the subject 237 has demanded 10 units of forestland and is entitled to have 3 permits. In this way, the aggregate 238 supply of permits was derived for each session. For example, in session 3, 22 units were determined 239 as the aggregate supply, which is 30% of the total demand of 63 units (See figure 2(c) ). Utilizing the information from the EVs of forestland, we can derive the demand and supply of 241 permits in the UPA. As mentioned earlier, we employ the UPA under trader settings. This means 242 that each subject is required to submit his or her bids to buy and offers to sell all at once in a single 243 trading period. Specifically, each subject is asked to submit his or her bids to buy, representing 244 how much he (she) is willing to pay for each additional unit of permits, as well as his or her offers 245 13 We admit that there might be a better way to determine an initial allocation of permits. However, when each subject reported his or her EVs, he (she) did not know in advance what types of experiments would proceed. Therefore, the way we have conducted the initial allocation does not affect both the reporting behaviors of the subjects and the results that follow.
to sell, representing the price with which he is willing to sell for each unit of permits he (she) possesses. For instance, consider a subject who is endowed with 3 permits and who faces an EV 247 schedule in table 2. In this case, he must submit 7 distinct bids to buy, each of which corresponds 248 to the potential purchase of the permits for the 4th, 5th, . . ., 10th units of forestland, and 3 distinct 249 offers to sell, each of which corresponds to the potential sale of the permits for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 250 units he (she) currently possesses.
251
If subjects are rational, the subjects' bids to buy and offers to sell should theoretically be very 252 close to the EVs (Cason and Plott, 1996) . In the experimental instructions by the Nepali language,
253
we clearly stated that if a bid to buy (an offer to sell) is higher (lower) than the corresponding EV,
254
then it may incur a loss. However, we did not repeatedly tell them so. Additionally, such irrational 255 behaviors are permitted, although some previous research does prohibit such irrationality. This Suppose that subjects are sufficiently rational and that they reveal their EVs through bids to buy 260 and offers to sell as predicted by economic theory. We can derive the aggregate demand and supply 261 for permits in each session by ranking the bids to buy from high to low and the offers to sell from 262 low to high. When the derived demand and supply are plotted together, it yields an equilibrium 263 volume of trade and an equilibrium price as the intersection of the two curves. consists of four subfigures, shows the derived demand and supply for permits in each session. of the markets appears to be close.
268
While there were neither computers nor internet connections in the field, everything was man- and their payoffs for that period.
277
Suppose that a subject has the EVs for forestland as shown in table 2 and is endowed with 3 278 units of initial permits. In this case, a subject is asked to submit 3 distinct offers to sell and 7 279 distinct bids to buy. If the uniform price is announced as 18500, this subject buys two additional 280 permits by paying 18500 for each, because his bids to buy for the corresponding units are higher 281 than the price (21000 and 19000 for the 4th and 5th, respectively). In that trade, he must pay 37000 282 (= 2 × 18500) and will come into possession of five permits, which gives him a gross benefit of 283 159000 (the summation of EVs from 1st and 5th units). His payoff in that period is the difference 284 between the two, that is, 122000 (= 159000 − 37000). The further details of the rules and of the 285 auction mechanism of the UPA employed in this study are summarized in the appendix.
286
Many subjects do not have good math skills. Therefore, the calculations of the payoffs were 287 double-checked by research assistants. However, each subject appeared to understand the types of 288 situations in which he (she) incurred losses or obtained more benefits from trading. We instructed 289 subjects to trade in a way that they seek to obtain more benefits from trading. This explanation 290 was selected because many subjects have only limited educations but do have a sense of trading 291 for forest products in a local market. Typically, our participants were paid the equivalent of almost 292 US $2 in the local currency as a show-up fee. At the end of the session, experimental rupees 293 were converted to real NPR at the rate of 1000 experimental rupees = NPR 1, with each subject 294 earning a minimum of NPR 500 and a maximum of NPR 2000 for an average of NPR 800 which 295 is equivalent to approximately $12. This is a high stake for typical farmers in that region, as their 296 daily earnings range from $4 to $7. 14 Furthermore, the intersection of the supply and 311 demand occurs around NPR 20000 in each session. Note that this value could be considered an 312 equilibrium price of permits in the MPS.
313
The derived demand and supply curves are in figure 3, which consists of four subfigures, each 314 exhibiting the demand and supply for the permits in each session. As mentioned earlier, the demand 315 and supply for permits, respectively, represent the "bids to buy," as arranged from highest to lowest 316 and the "offers to sell," as arranged from lowest to highest, assuming that the subjects are rational
317
(See figures 3(a) to 3(d)). When subjects are rational, they should submit their bids to buy and 318 offers to sell that are close to their own EVs. Therefore, we should be able to observe the similar 319 demand and supply for permits in the experimental results as derived in figure 3 for each session.
320
The initial endowments of sessions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are 24, 20, 22 and 18 permits, respectively. The heterogeneous group of farmers from the five different villages and the community forestry user group determined this equilibrium price with a small variation of the equilibrium price: a minimum of NPR 16000 and a maximum of NPR 25000 (See figure 3) . experiment. In fact, we admit that a small portion of subjects appeared to be confused with the 366 rule of trading at the initial stage in some sessions, especially, during session 4. In that session, we 367 observed that such confusion led to very irrational bidding and offering strategies and contributed 368 to the loss of efficiency gains. 16 However, as additional periods passed, we also have found that 369 such confusion gradually disappeared in most cases of sessions 1, 2 and 3.
370
In summary, the UPA under trader settings in our experiments has shown high efficiency of 80% 371 on average. In comparison to the prior laboratory experiments on the UPA and the DA, the statistics 372 and observed efficiencies reported earlier are consistent with previous works (Cason and Plott, 373 1996) . For instance, Cason and Plott (1996) report an efficiency gain of 90.9% using more educated 374 subjects and a UPA under a non-trader setting. Because our experiment was conducted in the field 375 with less educated subjects under a trader setting, the 10% decline of efficiency observed in our 376 experiment could be considered legitimate. Overall, we would say that the observed efficiencies 377 are high enough that the MPS is effective in the real-life conditions of the field. between NPR 15000 and NPR 25000. The greatest deviation between the TEP and the observed 388 price is visible in session 4. As mentioned earlier, we realize that in that session, some subjects 389 did not follow the usual trading or consistent strategies under the UPA as argued by Smith and 390 Williams (1982) , Cason and Plott (1996) because of the confusion they had at the initial stages,
391
and this may be the main reason for the large discrepancy between the TEP and the observed prices 392 of that session. in relation to endowment effects, which will be detailed later.
393

401
[ when subjects are induced to reveal their true valuations for forestland through market exchange.
407
Economic theory predicts that a UPA will tend to induce demand revelation at a margin if a subject 408 behaves optimally, which means that he (she) should submit his or her "bids to buy" and "offer to 409 sell" near the EVs (See Cason and Plott, 1996) .
410
In figures 6 and 7, a circle mark represents each observed bid to buy and offer to sell, the straight 411 line represents a 45 degree slope, and a thick line represents the median regression line estimated 412 with the data which will be explained later. In these figures, we can observe that bidding and The regression is specified as follows:
where bid i is an observed bid to buy, and offer i is an offer to sell as revealed by subject i during the 425 experiments, v i is the corresponding EV for the unit of forestland, β 0 and β 1 are the parameters and 426 ε is defined as the stochastic error term. Note that if the estimates in the above median regressions 427 produce a zero intercept and a slope of 1, then the subjects are considered to have 100% demand 428 revelation.
429
Then, the estimates for each of the bids to buy and offers to sell are obtained as follows: that our experiments were conducted in the field and asked subjects to think of the "real" good of 443 forestland, which is different from the controlled laboratory experiment reported in the literature.
444
Most of prior works employ a neutral terminology to describe marketable permits by expressing 445 them as coupons and pollution as production. In contrast, we have used the term "forest" directly 446 throughout the experiments because of our intent to explore the efficiencies of the MPS for real 447 forest management practices.
448
In our experimental environment, endowment effects can induce the subjects to over-report results demonstrate that efficiency losses from the effects are not so significant, and that our UPA 456 institution could be considered efficient in the field even in the presence of endowment effects.
457
Overall, the market performances observed in our experiment, with the UPA institution under 458 trader settings with real subjects, are quite consistent with the result of Cason and Plott (1996) (Renard, 2007 , Pruetz and Standridge, 2009 , Corkindaie, 2013 . To the best of our knowledge, the 495 TDR efficiencies have not been addressed empirically in the field, and such evaluation is going to 496 be important for further application of TDRs. Our research implies that the efficiencies of TDR 497 applied to many types of land use in these countries can be evaluated through field experiments,
498
and it is likely that high efficiencies in TDR field experiments are observed. forestland development were derived through the observed trades in field experiments, using the 508 elicited demand and supply relationships of permits involving 40 subjects.
509
The experimental results show that the MPS was effective with high efficiency of 80% in the 510 real-life conditions of the field. The UPA is considered to be a key element for this result because this result shows a good scope for the MPS and potential to be an effective policy option for the 518 practice of natural resources management with less administrative burden.
519
Another important point to mention is that through the markets elicited across the four sessions 520 of experimentation, an average equilibrium price was estimated at NPR 22000 per Khatta of forest- 
527
The MPS itself does not always guarantee an efficient market to emerge through simply asking 528 people to trade marketable permits. This study could be considered an illustration of how the 529 MPS is a flexible and cost-effective market instrument that could potentially play a vital role in 530 addressing real world natural resource problems. Here, we admit that the inception of marketable 531 permits for forest conservation in rural parts of Nepal is a very difficult task in reality. However,
532
our field experiments have shown that even local farmers can achieve high efficiency gains under
533
UPA institutions, which may be considered an important first step toward realistic application 534 of the MPS to natural resource conservation. As an implication of our results, the farmers who 535 highly value forestland resources will benefit from buying permits and those who put a low value 536 will benefit by selling the permits. Hence, the issues of social injustice and the unfair welfare We mainly rely on oral explanation to introduce our field experiment to the subjects because they are local farmers and many of them are illiterate. Therefore, we repeatedly explained how the trades of permits would be determined using the Nepali local language of the first author, and ran trial periods before we started the "real round" experiments. We made sure that every subject understood the rules. In this appendix, we detail translated versions of our oral explanation made to our subjects.
You can earn "experimental money" by trading "permits." However, subjects, including yourself, do not know in advance how many periods will be experienced until the end of the experiment. Subjects' earnings in each period are determined as follows:
Payoff =Net benefit (hereafter, EV) from commercial forestland + Sale proceeds from selling permits − Amount spent on buying permits.
Why are permits required?
The permits are necessary for farmers to utilize the forestland as private commercial forests, enjoying the forest product and resources harvested from there. However, note that all subjects have to bear some obligations as a member of a community forest user group (CFUG), irrespective of their ownership of commercial forests.
17 You can enjoy the EVs of the commercial forestland the you own in permits. If anybody wants to have additional commercial forestland to develop and utilize, he has to buy additional permits, and those who does not want to utilize forestland can sell their permits to others and receive the payments. Simply, subjects have a chance to trade "permits" in each period.
Everyone starts the experiment with his or her initial "permits," and can adjust his or her own holdings of "permits" by buying and selling them in the market that will operate. If subjects sell their permits, their benefit increases by the amount of sale. If subjects buy additional permits, their benefit decreases by the amount of payment. In what follows, we explain the rules for buying and selling permits.
Why might a subject want to buy permits?
Remember, as mentioned earlier, that permits allow subjects to develop or utilize forestland for commercial use as they wish. First, see table 2, in which a subject reveals the EVs for 10 units (1st to 10th) of forestland as his or her demand. He (she) currently holds 3 permits, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd units of which he can enjoy the corresponding EVs. However, for the remaining 7 units from the 4th to 10th units, he (she) cannot enjoy the corresponding EVs, because he does not possess the permits for these units of forestland. In summary, his or her total commercial forestland demand is 10 units, but he (she) can only receive the sum of EVs for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd units of commercial forestland (= 113000 = 30000 + 38000 + 45000) as a net benefit when he (she) has 3 units of permits. However, if he (she) is allowed to trade the permits, it may be better to buy an additional permit. For instance, the EV of the 4th unit is 25000, and if the subject can buy an additional permit with a price less than 25000, this might be a good idea because he (she) obtains an additional unit of forestland at a cheaper value than the EV. More specifically, if the subject buys an additional permit at the price of 21000, he gets a surplus of 4000 = 25000 − 21000. In this case, the subject ends up owning 4 units of permits after the trade, and can thus develop 4 units of forestland for commercial use. Note that the same logic applies when the subject wants to buy additional permits to increase the surplus for each of the 5th, 6th, . . . , 10th units of forestland.
Why might a subject want to sell permits?
Continuing the previous example, suppose that a subject initially holds 3 permits with corresponding EVs, as in table 2. The EV of the 3rd unit is 30000, but if he (she) can sell a permit of the 3rd unit with a price more than 30000, this might be a good idea because these sales revenues exceed his EV of this unit. For example, if he (she) sells the permit of the 3rd unit with the price, 35000, which is higher than his EV, he will get a surplus of 5000 (= 35000 − 30000). The same logic applies to the 1st and 2nd units of permits whenever he wants to sell an additional permit.
Trading rules of permits
The authority requires that, in each period, a subject submits bids to buy, representing the price he (she) is willing to pay to purchase each additional unit of permits, and offers to sell, representing the price with which he (she) is willing to sell each additional unit of permits that he (she) holds. Table 2 illustrates that as this subject has 3 permits, he (she) must submit 3 distinct offers to sell, representing the price with which he is willing to sell each unit of permits he (she) holds, and also must submit 7 distinct bids to buy, representing the price he is willing to pay to purchase each additional permit he may obtain. Therefore, the general rule for submitting offers to sell and bids to buy for each subject is written as follows:
The number of offers to sell + the number of bids to buy = the total demand for commercial forestland.
After the offers to sell and bids to buy from all participants are collected in the way explained above, the authority ranks all the bids to buy from highest to lowest as a demand curve and all the offers to sell from lowest to highest as a supply curve for permits. For example, imagine that the aggregate demand of 10 participants for forestland in one session is 43 units, in which 13 units of permits are distributed to subjects. Then, the authority will receive 13 distinct offers to sell and 30 distinct bids to buy and create a ranking of these offers and bids as shown in table 5. Here, units of permits are traded in order, as long as the bids to buy exceed or equal the matching offers to sell. In that table, the highest 12 bids to buy and the lowest 12 offers to sell should be accepted as effective trades.
[ Table 5 about here.]
The uniform price, which is paid by all buyers and is received by all sellers, is determined as the average of the bid to buy and the offer to sell of the last unit traded. In this example, the last unit traded is the 12th unit of permits. Therefore, the uniform market price is 20000 = (20000 + 20000)/2, and all units traded in this market are bought and sold at this price. After the authority announces this uniform price, trades occur and pay-offs are calculated as described earlier. 50000  10000  7th  50000  14000  8th  35000  15000  9th  30000  15000  10th  28000  18000  11th  25000  20000  12th  20000  20000  13th  20000  25000  14th  16000  -15th  15000  -16th  13000  -17th  13000  -18th  12000  -19th  11000  -20th  10000  -21st  10000  -22nd  10000  -23rd  9000  -24th  8000  -25th  8000  -26th  8000  -27th  7000  -28th  7000  -29th  6000  -30th 6000 -
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